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We present a model of participation in large elections in which the formation of
voter groups is endogenous. Partisan citizens decide whether to become lead-
ers (activists) and try to persuade impressionable citizens to vote for the leaders’
preferred party. In the (unique) pure strategy equilibrium, the number of lead-
ers favoring each party depends on the cost of activism and the importance of
the election. In turn, the expected turnout and the winning margin in an elec-
tion depend on the number of leaders and the strength of social interactions. The
model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the expected turnout and
the winning margin in large elections.
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“Most people are other people. Their thoughts are someone else’s opinions,
their lives a mimicry, their passions a quotation.” (Oscar Wilde, De Pro-
fundis, 1905)
“Si nos habitudes naissent de nos propres sentimens dans la retraite, elles
naissent de l’opinion d’autrui dans la Société. Quand on ne vit pas en soi,
mais dans les autres, ce sont leurs jugemens qui règlent tout ...” (Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Lettre à M. d’Alembert, 1758)
1. INTRODUCTION
It has been observed that an individual’s decision to cast a vote in a large election is
strongly correlated with indicators of the degree to which the individual is integrated
in society. Empirical research from the US and other countries has found that citizens
who are better educated, older, more religious, married, and less mobile are more likely
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to vote.1 The decision to cast a vote, it has also been observed, is weakly related to the
individual beneﬁt of voting; the signiﬁcant of variations in the cost of voting due to, say,
weather conditions, has been shown to be marginal.2
Overall, the evidence suggests that in order to understand voter participation in
large elections we must look beyond individual voters to the groups they belong to. This
is hardly surprising. If voters are motivated only by the effect their actions may have on
the result of an election and there is only a small cost involved in the act of voting then
game-theoreticmodelspredictadismallylowturnout—apredictionclearlyatoddswith
mass participation in elections.3 Thus, for empirical and theoretical reasons, attention
has turned to modeling participation in elections as a group activity.
The earliest group-based models of voter turnout (e.g. Uhlaner 1989 and Morton
1991) effectively substitute a game between relatively few players (groups or rather the
leaders of groups) for a game between many players (voters at large). Early models em-
phasize either side-payments, social pressure, or “group identity” as explanations of
why individual voters would follow group leaders. More recently, Feddersen and San-
droni (2006), following Harsanyi (1980), propose an ethical theory of group behavior in
elections. Coate and Conlin (2004) propose an ethical model similar to that of Fedder-
sen and Sandroni (2006). Incidentally, Coate and Conlin assume that the distribution of
supporters of each party is the beta distribution, while we obtain endogenously a beta
distribution of supporters by aggregating the inﬂuence of leaders.
The group-based models of voter turnout proposed so far have in common the idea
that the electorate is divided into mutually exclusive prearranged groups. Each group
has a leader that spends effort to persuade group members (the leader’s potential fol-
lowers) to vote. In this paper we take leaders and their groups as endogenous: leaders
emerge out of the population and compete for followers. We look at the implications
of having endogenous leaders/groups for electoral participation in large elections. We
propose a model in which there is a continuum of citizens distributed uniformly over a
circle that represents the social network. Each of a countable inﬁnity of citizens has an
unbending preference for a party and is a potential opinion leader, while the rest, the
overwhelming majority, are followers whose preferences can be inﬂuenced by opinion
leaders. Citizens with strong preferences must decide whether to become leaders and
mobilize groups of voters in support of their preferred candidate in an election. If a cit-
izen becomes a leader, the citizen is assigned an interval of inﬂuence on the circle. The
length of the interval of inﬂuence of each leader is random, as leaders cannot know ex-
actly what their leadership effort will accomplish, e.g. how far the leader’s inﬂuence will
spreadinthesocialnetwork. Nonetheless,leaderscompeteforfollowerssothelengthof
a leader’s interval of inﬂuence depends negatively on the number of other leaders and
1ThelandmarkstudyofWolﬁngerandRosenstone(1980)fortheUSshowstheimportanceofeducation,
age, marriage, and mobility. The recent study by Blais (2000) in nine democratic countries, including the
US, maintains that education and age are important factors as are religiosity, income, and marriage.
2Knack (1994) shows that the impact of rain on voter turnout in the US is minimal. See the excellent
discussion in Blais (2000).
3See e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985), who build on earlier work by Ledyard (1984). An elegant
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possibly also on exogenous breaks in the circle, which represent weak spots in social
interactions. Leaders are able to bring inﬂuenceable citizens in their leadership group
to the voting booth. While becoming a leader is costly, it has the potential beneﬁt of
swinging the election in the direction favored by the leader.
ThegamebetweenpotentialleadershassomeanalogieswiththePalfreyandRosen-
thal (1983, 1985) voter participation game. Leaders in our model compare the probabil-
ityofbeingdecisivewiththecost/beneﬁtratioofpoliticalactivism,justascitizensinthe
Palfrey–Rosenthalmodelcomparetheprobabilityofbeingdecisivewiththecost/beneﬁt
ratio of voting. Like citizens in the Palfrey–Rosenthal model, potential leaders in our
model become activists in low (that is, ﬁnite) numbers because the probability of be-
ing decisive declines with participation. However, since each leader commands broad
support in the society, voter turnout in our model is relatively high.
What distinguishes our game between potential leaders from a voter participation
game is that group leaders are uncertain about how much support they will muster, and
theintroductionofanewleaderislikelytoreducetheexpectedsupportofexistinglead-
ers. These features of the model are important in terms of comparative statics. When
there are few leaders in relation to the number of exogenous breaks, the main effect of
adding new leaders (say, in response to a decrease in the cost/beneﬁt ration of activism)
is to bring voters from abstention rather than to reduce the support of existing leaders.
Thus, if there are initially few leaders, increasing the number of leaders increases the
expected margin of victory. Intuitively, the variance in the difference between the num-
ber of votes for one party and the number of votes for the other increases if we add new
leaders whose support is approximately independent of the support of other leaders. If
there are many leaders in relation to the number of exogenous breaks, we get the op-
posite result. With many leaders, the main effect of adding new leaders is to take away
supporters from existing leaders, which reduces the expected margin of victory. Intu-
itively, the variance in the difference between the number of votes for one party and the
number of votes for the other is reduced because of the increased (negative) covariance
of the supports of the two parties.
Inourmodel,increasingthenumberofleadersforeachpartyincreasestheexpected
winning margin if the expected turnout is below 50% and decreases the expected win-
ning margin if the expected turnout is above 50%. Since increasing the number of lead-
ers always increases turnout, we get a nonmonotonic relationship between the winning
margin and the expected turnout. For commonly observed turnout levels, though, the
model predicts a positive association between turnout and the closeness of the election
result, in accordance with the evidence. Our model illustrates the ability of group-based
theories of voting to generate nontrivial, testable implications about the relationship
between turnout and winning margin, and it also suggests the need to gather evidence
about the winning margin in elections with relatively low turnout rates.
Another comparative static result we obtain is that stronger social interactions
among citizens imply that each leader has a greater inﬂuence on followers, which in
turn increases the voter turnout and the winning margin. The empirical implication
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can interpret the strength of social interactions in our model as reﬂecting the size of
the polity, which introduces the possibility of segmented support for potential leaders,
or the quality of group leaders in terms of their ability to address larger audiences. The
strengthoflocalinteractionscanalsobecorrelatedwiththeextentofoverlappingmem-
berships in social institutions such as unions and churches. In our model, fractionaliza-
tion of unions and churches, even keeping total union or church membership constant,
should depress turnout and lead to tighter elections.
Our model has some resemblance to the citizen-candidate models pioneered by Os-
borne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Our model has in common with
theirstheideaofendogenizingpoliticalactivism. However, thetypeofpoliticalactivism
we try to capture in our model is radically different. Citizen-candidate models focus
on the formation of party platforms and consider political activists who are candidates
themselves, but they do not consider the issue of voter turnout. Our model, by compar-
ison, takes party platforms as given and focuses on the issue of voter turnout. Further,
political activists in our model are not candidates themselves, but rather citizens inter-
ested in inﬂuencing the election outcome. Finally, we assume that most voters, unlike
political activists, have very weak policy preferences and may vote for one candidate or
the other. In the conclusions, we discuss some implications of this assumption versus
the alternative assumption that voters are arranged in a one-dimensional policy space.
We can also compare our model with the work by Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) and
Morton (1991) on voter mobilization. In our model, leaders are not exogenously given
and groups are not ﬁxed or mutually exclusive. The margin of analysis on which we
focus is that of the decision to try to inﬂuence all (or most) citizens, rather than the
effort invested in mobilizing pre-assigned followers.
Our work is also related to the literature on social interactions pioneered by Glaeser
et al. (1996), among others.4 We borrow from them the arrangement of citizens on a
circle and the idea that most citizens imitate the behavior of the group to which they
belong, while some act independently. We deviate in that the number of citizens who
act as leaders is derived endogenously in the model. When both the costs and beneﬁts
of an activity such as casting a vote or issuing an opinion are very low, most people are
impressionable5 and may be content to follow the lead of a few, as expressed, perhaps
not without certain pessimism, by Rousseau and Wilde in our introductory quotations.
2. THE MODEL
Weconsiderawinner-take-allelectionwithtwoalternativesorparties,A and B. Thereis
a continuum of citizens of measure one. The members of a countably inﬁnite subset of
thecitizensarecommittedpartyA partisans, themembersofanothercountablyinﬁnite
subsetofcitizensarecommittedparty B partisans,andtheremainder,thevastmajority,
are uncommitted inﬂuenceable citizens whom we refer to as followers. Partisans enjoy
a net gain of G > 0 if their preferred party wins the election. The party favored by the
4See Becker and Murphy (2000) and Durlauf and Young (2001) for more recent contributions.
5The assumption that a large (possibly decisive) set of voters is impressionable has been used before by
Grossman and Helpman (2001), Baron (1994), and others.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Group formation and voter participation 465
larger number of votes wins the election. In case both parties obtain the same number
of votes, each wins with probability
1
2.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, every partisan citizen chooses whether
to become an active supporter of a party or not. We refer to an active supporter as an
opinion leader. Becoming a leader in favor of a particular party involves a utility cost
c > 0. Second, followers are assigned to (or inﬂuenced by) a leader or no leader at all
according to a random process described in detail below. In the benchmark model, all
the followers inﬂuenced by a leader are mobilized to vote for the party that the leader
supports. Finally, citizens who are not assigned to any leader abstain while all partisans
vote for the party they support. As will become clear later, the overwhelming majority
of partisan citizens do not become leaders but remain a negligible part of the voting
population.
We want to capture two important aspects of any leader’s inﬂuence. First, a leader is
uncertain about the number of followers the leader can inﬂuence to vote for the party
the leader favors. Second, the impact of a leader is diminished by the presence other
leaders: theleader’spersonalinﬂuenceonfollowersfadesthemoreleadersthereare. We
capture these two aspects of a leader’s inﬂuence by assuming that leaders are dropped
uniformly on a circle of measure one that represents the population of citizens. A ﬁxed
number O of exogenous interruptions is also dropped uniformly on the circle. Each
leader is assigned the arc of the circle of citizens adjacent to the leader in a clockwise
direction until the arc is interrupted by an exogenous interruption or by another leader,
asperGlaeseretal.(1996). Theinverseofthenumberofexogenousinterruptionsrepre-
sents the strength of social interactions or the reach of a leader’s inﬂuence absent other
leaders. When social interactions are strong, the inﬂuence of a leader is likely to extend
over the circle representing society until it is contested by some other leader. When so-
cial interactions are weak, the inﬂuence of a leader is likely to die out independently of
the inﬂuence of other leaders.6
Figure 1 represents one possible realization of the inﬂuence of two party A leaders
and three party B leaders with two exogenous interruptions. In the benchmark model,
the sum of the blue arcs represents the voter turnout for party A, the sum of the red arcs
represents the voter turnout for party B, and the sum of the white arcs represents the
percentage of abstainers.
It is easy to check that only A-partisans want to become leaders in favor of party A,
and similarly for B. Let LA and LB represent the (ﬁnite) numbers of A and B-partisans
who become leaders. Using the model, we can calculate the probability that A wins the
election, say P(LA,LB). We deﬁne
PA(LA,LB)=P(LA,LB)−P(LA −1,LB)
PB(LA,LB)=P(LA,LB −1)−P(LA,LB)
as the probabilities that a leader for party A and for party B, respectively, are decisive in
6The assumption that the number of exogenous interruptions is ﬁxed is made only for simplicity. As we
explain later (in Section 5), our results hold if the number of exogenous interruptions is random.466 Herrera and Martinelli Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
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FIGURE 1. Inﬂuence of two party A leaders and three party B leaders.
favor of their party. We refer to these probabilities as decisiveness in favor of party A and
decisiveness in favor of party B, respectively.7
An equilibrium is a pair of nonnegative integers L∗
A,L∗
B such that
PA(L∗
A +1,L∗
B)≤c/G
PA(L∗
A,L∗
B)>c/G if L∗
A ≥1
PB(L∗
A,L∗
B +1)≤c/G
PB(L∗
A,L∗
B)>c/G if L∗
B ≥1.
Note that the deﬁnition of equilibrium makes no reference to the identities of the
partisans who become leaders. That is, we make no distinction between two situations
in which different citizens become leaders, as long as the number of leaders for each
party is the same. Note also that an equilibrium of the model is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium with the additional requirement that partisans become leaders only if they
are strictly better off doing so. Without this restriction, the game has multiple equilibria
for a countably inﬁnite number of values of c/G. With the restriction, it has a unique
equilibrium for all values of c/G. We describe the equilibrium of the model in the next
section.
3. DECISIVENESS AND EQUILIBRIUM
THEOREM 1. There is a unique equilibrium. If c/G <
1
2, in equilibrium L∗
A = L∗
B = L∗,
where L∗ ≥1 is the largest integer satisfying the inequality
1
22L−1
(2L −2)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!
>c/G.
7For LA or L B countably inﬁnite, we simply assume that the probability of being decisive is zero. This
guarantees that there is no equilibrium in which more than ﬁnitely many citizens become leaders.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Group formation and voter participation 467
If c/G ≥
1
2, L∗
A = L∗
B =0. If c/G <
1
2, the expected voter turnout in equilibrium is
2L∗
2L∗ +O
andtheexpectedwinningmargin(thedifferencebetweenthenumbersofvotesforthetwo
parties) in equilibrium is
2L∗
2L∗ +O

1
22L∗
(2L∗)!
L∗!L∗!

.
As will become clear from the proofs, the expression
1
22L−1
(2L −2)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!
represents decisiveness when there are L leaders for each party. Note that this expres-
sion is strictly decreasing in L and takes the value
1
2 when L = 1. If c/G ≤
1
2 and there is
some L0 such that
c/G =
1
22L0−1
(2L0 −2)!
(L0 −1)!(L0 −1)!
,
then according to the theorem the equilibrium is L∗
A = L∗
B = L0 − 1. In this case the
equilibrium is not strict; partisans who do not become leaders are indifferent between
becoming leaders or not.8 In every other case the equilibrium is strict.
The absence of asymmetric equilibria is due to the symmetry of decisiveness as de-
scribed below. Intuitively, if one party has more leaders than another party and their
partisans would be strictly worse off by decreasing the number of their leaders, then
necessarily a partisan of the party with less support would be strictly better off by be-
coming an additional leader.
Before the proof of the theorem, we state a series of lemmas, the proofs of which are
in the Appendix.
First, we consider the question of how a pair LA,LB of numbers of leaders for the
parties maps into the distribution of votes.
LEMMA 1. If LA, LB, andO are positive, the joint probability density function of the frac-
tion a of votes for party A and the fraction b for party B is
hLA,LB(a,b)=
(LA +LB +O −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!(O −1)!
aLA−1bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1
for 0≤a +b ≤1.
If LA and LB are positive andO =0, the probability density function of the fraction a
of votes for party A is
h0
LA,LB(a)=
(LA +LB −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!
aLA−1(1−a)LB−1
for 0≤a ≤1, and for any value of a, the fraction of votes for party B is 1−a.
8If the equilibrium deﬁnition did not preclude partisans from becoming leaders whenever indifferent,
any pair (L∗
A,L∗
B)∈{L0 −1,L0}2 would be an equilibrium.468 Herrera and Martinelli Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Lemma 1 establishes that the joint distribution of the fractions of votes going to
parties A and B is equal to the joint distribution of the LA-th order statistic and the
difference between the (LA + LB)-th and the LA-th order statistic of a sample of size
LA +LB +O −1 drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit interval.9 The idea of
the proof is the following. We can pick the location in the circle of any leader for party A
and consider that location point 0 (from the left) and point 1 (from the right). Thus, the
remainder of leaders and exogenous breaks is a uniform sample of size LA +LB +O −1.
Due to a symmetry property of uniform order statistics, we can calculate the fractions of
votes for parties A and B as if all the remaining leaders for party A came ﬁrst in the unit
interval and all the leaders for party B came second.
Thedistributionofpartysupporterswejustderivedisthebivariatebetadistribution
(also know as the Dirichlet distribution). In the special case O = 0 it reduces to the
univariate beta, which is incidentally the distribution of party supporters taken (with
exogenous parameters) as a starting point in Coate and Conlin (2004). In our model the
parameters of the beta distribution represent the leaders exactly: any potential leader
must assess exactly how much the change of parameters that his leadership induces in
the beta distribution increases the probability that the leader’s preferred party will win
the election. Next, we calculate the probability that party A wins the election.
LEMMA 2. If LA and LB are positive, the probability of party A winning the election is
P(LA,LB)=1−
LB X
k=1

1
2
LA+LB−1 (LA +LB −1)!
(LA +k −1)!(LB −k)!
.
Note that the probability of party A winning the election is independent of the num-
ber of exogenous interruptions. Following the line of the previous intuitive argument,
the probability that the LA-th order statistic is larger than the difference between the
(LA +LB)-th and LB-th order statistics is independent of the size of the sample.
Next, we use Lemma 2 to calculate the decisiveness in favor of party A.
LEMMA 3. If LA and LB are positive, the decisiveness in favor of party A is
PA(LA,LB)=
1
2LA+LB−1
(LA +LB −2)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!
.
This expression for decisiveness is exceedingly simple and plays a key role in the
proof of the theorem.
Finally, we derive some useful properties of decisiveness from this expression.
LEMMA 4. If LA and LB are positive, decisiveness satisﬁes the following properties.
(i) (Near single-peakedness)
PA(LA,LB)ÒPA(LA +1,LB) ⇐⇒ LA +1Ò LB.
9We follow the convention of naming the kth smallest element in the sample the kth-order statistic, for
any k.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Group formation and voter participation 469
 
 
FIGURE 2. Decisiveness of a leader.
(ii) (Symmetry)
PA(LA,LB)=PA(LB,LA)=PB(LB,LA).
Lemma 4 establishes, in particular, that decisiveness in favor of a party achieves its
maximumvaluewhenthepartyhaseitherthesamenumberofleadersastheotherparty
or one leader less.
Figure 2 illustrates the decisiveness of a leader of party A or party B as a function of
the number of leaders of either party. To construct the plot we use the gamma function,
which is conveniently deﬁned over the reals, rather than the factorial function.
The decisiveness peaks on the diagonal axis (LA = LB), which is when the election is
most likely to end up in a tie, illustrating the fact that there is little use in becoming an
additional leader if one’s preferred party is already very likely to win or lose the election.
Also, the decisiveness decreases along the diagonal because of increased competition
between leaders, which implies a smaller average inﬂuence of leaders.
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1. Using the equilibrium conditions, any equilibrium L∗
A,L∗
B with
positive numbers of leaders for parties A and B must be such that
PA(L∗
A,L∗
B)>c/G ≥PA(L∗
A +1,L∗
B)
PB(L∗
A,L∗
B)>c/G ≥PB(L∗
A,L∗
B +1).
Using symmetry (Lemma 4ii), these conditions are equivalent to
PA(L∗
A,L∗
B)>c/G ≥PA(L∗
A +1,L∗
B)
PA(L∗
B,L∗
A)>c/G ≥PA(L∗
B +1,L∗
A).
Using near single-peakedness (Lemma 4i), we get
L∗
A +1> L∗
B and L∗
B +1> L∗
A,
which together imply
L∗
A = L∗
B.470 Herrera and Martinelli Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Thus,anyequilibriumwithpositivenumbersofleadersforpartiesA and B mustbesuch
that L∗
A = L∗
B = L∗, where L∗ satisﬁes
PA(L∗,L∗)>c/G ≥PA(L∗ +1,L∗).
Using symmetry, this condition is equivalent to
PA(L∗,L∗)>c/G ≥PA(L∗,L∗ +1).
Using near single-peakedness (Lemma 4i), the equilibrium condition is
PA(L∗,L∗)>c/G ≥PA(L∗ +1,L∗ +1).
Now, from Lemma 3 we get
PA(L,L)=
1
22L−1
(2L −2)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!
.
Note that this expression is strictly decreasing in L and takes the value
1
2 when L = 1.
Thus, there are equilibria with positive numbers of leaders for parties A and B if and
only if c/G <
1
2, and they are as described by the statement of the theorem.
Consider now an equilibrium in which there is a positive number L∗
A of leaders for
party A and no leaders for party B. The equilibrium conditions are
PA(L∗
A,0)>c/G ≥PA(L∗
A +1,0)
c/G ≥PB(L∗
A,1).
Recall that if both parties receive the same fraction of votes, the election is resolved by
a fair coin toss. Since neither party receives votes when there are no leaders, we have
P(0,0) =
1
2. Since only party A receives a positive fraction of votes when L∗
A is positive
and L∗
B is zero, we have P(L∗
A,0) = 1 for L∗
A ≥ 1. Thus, PA(1,0) =
1
2 and PA(L∗
A,0) = 0 for
L∗
A ≥2. Using the ﬁrst equilibrium condition above, we get L∗
A =1. From symmetry and
Lemma 3, we get PB(1,1) = PA(1,1) =
1
2. Thus, for L∗
A = 1 the ﬁrst equilibrium condi-
tion above implies
1
2 > c/G and the second equilibrium condition implies c/G ≥
1
2, a
contradiction. It follows that there are no equilibria in which only party A has a positive
number of leaders. A similar argument shows that there are no equilibria in which only
party B has a positive number of leaders.
Finally, consider an equilibrium in which neither party has a positive number of
leaders. The equilibrium conditions are
c/G ≥PA(1,0)
c/G ≥PB(0,1).
We established in the previous paragraph that PA(1,0) =
1
2. A similar argument shows
that PB(0,1) =
1
2. Thus, there is an equilibrium in which neither party has a positive
number of leaders if and only if c/G ≥
1
2.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Group formation and voter participation 471
For the remainder of the proof we assume that there is a positive number of leaders
L for each party. With respect to voter participation, forO = 0 it is easy to see that voter
turnout is 1, as results from the formula provided in the statement of the theorem. For
O ≥1, we have that the expected turnout in equilibrium is
E(a +b)=
Z 1
0
Z 1−a
0
(a +b)hL,L(a,b)db da.
Using Lemma 1,
E(a +b)=
(2L +O −1)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!(O −1)!
Z 1
0
Z 1−a
0
(a +b)aL−1bL−1(1−a −b)O−1db da.
Or equivalently,
E(a +b)=
(2L +O −1)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!(O −1)!
×
Z 1
0
Z 1−a
0

aLbL−1(1−a −b)O−1 +aL−1bL(1−a −b)O−1
db da.
Using Lemma 1 again,
E(a +b)=
(2L +O −1)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!(O −1)!
×
(L −1)!L!(O −1)!
(2L +O)!
×
 Z 1
0
Z 1−a
0
hL+1,L(a,b)db da +
Z 1
0
Z 1−a
0
hL,L+1(a,b)db da
!
.
Since hL+1,L(a,b) and hL,L+1(a,b) are bivariate probability density functions with sup-
port 0≤a +b ≤1, we get
E(a +b)=
(2L +O −1)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!(O −1)!
×
(L −1)!L!(O −1)!
(2L +O)!
× 2.
The result on voter turnout in the statement of the theorem follows.
With respect to the closeness of the election, suppose that O ≥ 1. (The proof for
O =0 is similar.) Using Lemma 1, the expected winning margin is
E(|a −b|)=2E(a −b |a >b)
=2
Z 1
0
Z min{a,1−a}
0
(a −b)hL,L(a,b)db da
=
2(2L +O −1)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!(O −1)!
Z 1
0
Z min{a,1−a}
0
(a −b)aL−1bL−1(1−a −b)O−1db da
=
2(2L +O −1)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!(O −1)!
×
Z 1
0
Z min{a,1−a}
0

aLbL−1(1−a −b)O−1 −aL−1bL(1−a −b)O−1
db da.472 Herrera and Martinelli Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Using Lemma 1 again,
E(|a −b|)=
2(2L +O −1)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!(O −1)!
×
(L −1)!L!(O −1)!
(2L +O)!
×
 Z 1
0
Z min{a,1−a}
0
hL+1,L(a,b)db da −
Z 1
0
Z min{a,1−a}
0
hL,L+1(a,b)db da
!
.
Note that
P(LA,LB)=
Z 1
0
Z min{a,1−a}
0
hLA,LB(a,b)db da.
Thus, we get
E(|a −b|)=
2L
2L +O
(P(L +1,L)−P(L,L +1)).
Using the deﬁnitions of decisiveness in favor of party A and party B and symmetry
(Lemma 4ii),
E(|a −b|)=
2L
2L +O
(PA(L +1,L +1)+PB(L +1,L +1))
=
4L
2L +O
PA(L +1,L +1).
Using Lemma 3,
E(|a −b|)=
2L
2L +O

1
22L
(2L)!
L!L!

,
as stated in the theorem. 
4. TURNOUT AND WINNING MARGIN
Inthissectionweanalyzetherelationshipbetweentheparametersofthemodel,namely
the cost/beneﬁt ratio of political activism (c/G) and the strength of social interactions
(1/O), and the endogenous, observable variables of the model, namely the expected
voter turnout and the expected winning margin.
Theorem 1 calculates the equilibrium number of leaders for each party as a (de-
creasing) function of the cost/beneﬁt ratio of activism. The effects of changes in the
cost/beneﬁt ratio of activism and the strength of social interactions on the equilibrium
expected voter turnout follow immediately from Theorem 1.
COROLLARY 1. An increase in the strength of social interactions increases the expected
voter turnout and the expected winning margin. A reduction in the cost/beneﬁt ratio
of activism (weakly) increases the expected voter turnout.
Stronger social interactions imply more effective leadership while the equilibrium
number of leaders remains unchanged. A stronger average inﬂuence of each leader im-
plies a higher voter turnout for each party and a higher variance in the number of votes
for each party which in turn implies a higher winning margin. While the effect of the
cost/beneﬁt ratio of activism on voter turnout is unambiguous, its effect on the close-
ness of the election result is more complex.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Group formation and voter participation 473
COROLLARY 2. If the cost/beneﬁt ratio of activism decreases, then the expected winning
margin (weakly) decreases if initially the expected turnout is above
1
2 and it (weakly) in-
creases if initially the expected turnout is below
1
2.
PROOF. From Theorem 1, we have that the expected winning margin with L+1 leaders
is
L +1
L +1+O/2

1
22L+2
(2L +2)!
(L +1)!(L +1)!

,
and with L leaders is
L
L +O/2

1
22L
(2L)!
L!L!

.
The ratio of these two expressions is
1+1/(2L)
1+1/(L +O/2)
,
which is smaller than one if and only if O < 2L (or equivalently, if and only if expected
turnout is smaller than
1
2) and is larger than one if and only ifO >2L. 
Intuitively, if the number of voters is expected to be smaller than the number of ab-
stainers, then extra leaders are more likely to persuade abstainers to vote rather than
to steal voters from other leaders, thereby increasing the variance of the difference be-
tween the votes received by the parties. If, instead, the fraction of voters is expected
to be larger than the fraction of abstainers, then new leaders tend to steal voters from
each other rather than persuading abstainers to vote, thereby reducing the variance of
the difference between the votes received by the parties. In sum, elections with higher
voter turnout are closer elections only when the turnout is expected to be high (the ma-
jority votes), while in elections for which the turnout is expected to be low (the majority
abstains), a higher actual turnout suggests a higher expected margin of victory.
In most democracies, the average voter turnout in elections at the national level is
above 50% (see e.g. Blais 2000). In these circumstances, our model predicts that move-
ments in the cost/beneﬁt ratio of activism lead to movements in the winning margin
in the same direction. If, as seems likely, the costs and beneﬁts of activism experience
more short-term variations than the strength of social interactions, we should expect to
see a negative short-term correlation between the winning margin and voter turnout.
Long term trends in voter turnout, however, are likely to be affected by trends in both
the cost/beneﬁt ratio of activism and the strength of social interactions.
The relation between the winning margin (or rather, the election closeness) and
voter turnout has been the subject of empirical literature reviewed recently by Blais
(2000). In this author’s words,
the verdict is crystal clear with respect to closeness: closeness has been
found to increase turnout in 27 out of the 32 studies that have tested the re-
lationship,inmanydifferentsettingsandwithdiversemethodologies. (Blais
2000, p. 60)474 Herrera and Martinelli Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Blais goes on to state that the importance of election closeness is not captured by
direct measures of the very small probability of a single vote being decisive. The posi-
tive relationship between election closeness and voter turnout, it seems, should be ad-
dressed at the group/leader level.
Let T be the expected turnout and W be the expected winning margin. Using Theo-
rem 1, we can obtain an approximation for the parameters of the model when there is a
lot of activism (that is, when the cost/beneﬁt ratio of activism is small):
COROLLARY 3. For ﬁxed 1/O,
lim
c/G→0

c/G
W/(2T)

=1 and lim
c/G→0

1/O
πW 2/(2T(1−T))

=1.
(See the proof in the Appendix.) Corollary 3 suggests that, for any given democracy, the
ratio of winning margin to turnout should be positively correlated with other measures
of the cost of political activism. Similarly, the ratio of the square of the winning margin
to the product of participation and abstention rates should be positively correlated with
other measures of the strength of local interactions, such as the extent of overlapping
memberships in social institutions.
5. EXTENSIONS
Randomness in the number of exogenous interruptions in the circle is easily incorpo-
rated into the model. Though the model assumes leaders who are identical except for
theirpartypreferences,itcanbeextendedtoallowforheterogeneouscost/beneﬁtratios
of activism under some conditions.
5.1 Random interruptions
Assume that the number of exogenous interruptions in the circle is a random variable
˜ O with bounded support whose realization is not known by partisan citizens at the mo-
ment of deciding whether to become leaders. For any given numbers of leaders for par-
ties A and B, theprobability of party A winning theelection is thesame regardless ofthe
realization of ˜ O and is given by Lemma 2. Thus, the decisiveness in favor of party A is as
given by Lemma 3 and therefore the equilibrium number of leaders is as given by The-
orem 1. Expected voter turnout is now the expectation (conditional on the realization
of ˜ O) of the expression for voter turnout in Theorem 1, and similarly for the expected
winning margin.
5.2 Heterogeneous leadership costs
Assume that the cost of activism (or equivalently, the importance of the election) is het-
erogeneous across partisan voters and distributed according to some continuous prob-
ability density with the lower endpoint of the support given by c > 0. Recall that the
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equilibrium number of leaders L∗ is given by the largest integer solution to the inequal-
ity
PA(L,L)>c/G.
There is really no difference with the homogeneous case. There may be some inefﬁ-
ciency, though, since the leaders in equilibrium are not necessarily the partisan citizens
with lower costs. Only the citizens with a cost/beneﬁt ratio smaller than PA(L∗,L∗) may
become leaders.
5.3 Different effectiveness of leaders
We have assumed so far that the interval of inﬂuence of a leader is random but the ef-
fectiveness of the leaders of each party is the same. That is, we have assumed a leader
could persuade all the voters in the leader’s interval of inﬂuence to vote for the leader’s
preferred party. More generally, we can assume that leaders of party A and party B can
attract only the fractions α ∈ (0,1] and β ∈ (0,1], respectively, of the potential voters in
their interval of inﬂuence. This setup allows for the proportions α and β to depend on a
predisposition of impressionable voters in favor of either party. For α = β, the equilib-
rium number of leaders of the model is the one we previously obtained; only the voter
turnout should be scaled down accordingly if α = β < 1. If α 6= β, then the equilib-
rium is no longer necessarily symmetric. To extend the model we need to recalculate
the decisiveness in favor of party A and party B.
LEMMA 5. Let γ = α/(α+β). If LA and LB are positive, the decisiveness in favor of party
A is
PA(LA,LB)=(1−γ)LA−1γLB (LA +LB −2)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!
and the decisiveness in favor of party B is
PB(LA,LB)=((1−γ)LAγLB−1 (LA +LB −2)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!
.
(See the proof in the Appendix.)
The constant ratio of decisiveness
PB(LA,LB)/PA(LA,LB)=(1−γ)/γ=β/α
is an indicator of the advantage of party B relative to party A. We can easily check
PA(LA,LB)ÒPA(LA −1,LB) ⇐⇒ (LA −1)Ñ(β/α)(LB −1)
and
PB(LA,LB)ÒPB(LA,LB −1) ⇐⇒ (LA −1)Ò(β/α)(LB −1).
That is, both the decisiveness in favor of party A and the decisiveness in favor of party B
peak when the number of leaders is at or near the ratio
LA −1
LB −1
=
β
α
.476 Herrera and Martinelli Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
As in the case of symmetric effectiveness, the equilibrium conditions
PA(LA,LB)>
c
G
≥PA(LA +1,LB)
PB(LA,LB)>
c
G
≥PB(LA,LB +1)
must be satisﬁed simultaneously, which implies that decisiveness must be at its peak.
Note that for decisiveness to be at its peak, the party at a disadvantage must have more
leaders than the other party. That is, decisiveness peaks when the probabilities of win-
ning the election are near 50%.
6. FINAL REMARKS
There is no generally accepted model of the common social phenomenon of massive
voluntary participation in large elections. A recent survey article by Feddersen (2004)
has signalled what appears to be a growing interest in group-based models of voter
turnout in which group members participate in elections because they are directly co-
ordinated and rewarded by leaders. This paper is intended to be a contribution to the
literatureaboutgroupsinelections. Atthesubstantivelevel,byhavingleadersself-select
endogenously out of the population, our model sheds some light on how groups of vot-
ers can be formed and how voting behavior is affected by the underlying parameters
of the model. These parameters include the cost of political activism, the importance of
theelection,andthestrengthorweaknessofsocialinteractions,evenifthevastmajority
of voters do not behave strategically at the ballot box.
We carry out the analysis in a highly stylized environment. At the technical level, we
are able to obtain an attractive closed form expression for the equilibrium of the model
and the decisiveness of a leader. The equilibrium uniquely pins down the number of
leaders for each party. The uniqueness is essential to construct a theory of voter turnout
and the closeness of elections. We obtain intuitive comparative statics results with re-
spect to the expected voter turnout and some unexpected results with respect to the
expected winning margin. The fact that we deal successfully with the issues of existence
and uniqueness of the pure strategy equilibrium is, we believe, an encouraging step in
the direction of a satisfactory group-based model of elections.
We believe our model is ﬂexible enough to be extended in a number of ways beyond
those discussed in this paper. A version of the model that takes account of the different
effectiveness of leaders may be useful as a building block to incorporate the variable
effort of leaders. Though we focus on policy motivated leaders, incorporating a private
interest for leaders is clearly feasible (e.g. a reward from the party proportional to the
fraction of voters brought to the voting booth). Other extensions that may be of interest
areallowingleaderstohaveoverlappingintervalsofinﬂuenceandconsideringelections
with three or more candidates.
Further aﬁeld, it would be interesting to consider a group-based model of voting
in which voters were arranged in a one-dimensional policy space, and in which lead-
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random fraction of nearby voters. In such a model, we would expect there to be two
different situations for a leader: leaders closer to the ideological extremes would draw
voters (mostly) away from abstention, while leaders closer to moderate voters would
draw voters away from the other party. As in the model we have discussed in this pa-
per, there would be potentially a nonmonotonic relationship between expected turnout
and winning margin, depending on which of the two effects of increasing the number of
leaders (drawing voters away from abstention and drawing voters away from the other
party) is stronger. The equilibrium location of leaders, and therefore which of the two
effectsisstronger, wouldbeinﬂuencedbytheobjectivefunctionofleaders, e.g.whether
they maximize the size of their support or are policy-motivated. It is hard to guess un-
der which circumstances one of the two effects dominates the other without actually
setting up and solving this alternative model. In the model we present in this paper we
get a clear-cut result: drawing voters away from abstention dominates when turnout is
low, and drawing voters away from the other party dominates when turnout is high.
We have provided in this paper what we believe to be an interesting starting point
for considering the role of endogenous groups in a turnout game. Whether this or an
alternative model provides a more fruitful avenue for research is an open question.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
Before proving Lemma 1 we need some statistical results. Let n + 1 = LA + LB +O
be the total number of leaders and exogenous interruptions that are distributed uni-
formly on the circle. Pick any leader or exogenous interruption and call that point 0
(when moving counterclockwise) and 1 (when moving clockwise). From 0 to 1 (mov-
ing clockwise) the remaining n leaders and exogenous interruptions are distributed
uniformly. Let y1,...,yn (with y1 ≤ ··· ≤ yn) represent the (random) location of these
points. Then the interval of inﬂuence of each leader or interruption is x1 = y1,...,xk =
yk −yk−1,...,xn+1 =1−yn.
THEOREM A.1. The joint distribution of the intervals
(x1 =y1,...,xk =yk −yk−1,...,xn+1 =1−yn)
oftheuniformorderstatistic 0≤y1 <y2 <···<yn ≤1isinvariantunderanypermutation
of its components.
PROOF. See Reiss (1989, p. 40). 
This implies, in particular,
COROLLARY A.1. All marginal distributions of (x1,...,xk,...,xn+1) of equal dimension
are equal.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Givenasamplesizen,thejointdensityfunctionoftwoorderstatis-
tics for a uniform underlying distribution on the unit interval is
f (ai,a j)=
n!
(i −1)!(j −i −1)!(n − j)!
(ai)i−1(a j −ai)j−i−1(1−a j)n−j478 Herrera and Martinelli Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
for 0 ≤ ai < a j ≤ 1. Reordering the intervals of inﬂuence (see Corollary A.1) so that
all party A leaders are followed by all party B leaders and letting LA = i, LA + LB = j,
LA +LB +O =n +1, a =ai, andb =a j −ai, we get the bivariate distribution of a andb
whenO ≥1.
Similarly, the density function of an order statistic for a uniform underlying distri-
bution on the unit interval is
f (ai)=
n!
(i −1)!(n −i)!
(ai)i−1(1−ai)n−i
for 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1. Reordering the intervals of inﬂuence so that all party A leaders are fol-
lowed by all party B leaders and letting LA = i, LA +LB = n +1, and a = ai, we get the
distribution of a whenO =0. 
Before proving Lemmas 2 to 5, we need a couple of hypergeometric identities.10
LEMMA A.1. For all M ∈N, N ∈N, and d ∈(0,1),
N X
k=1
(1−d)M+N−k (M +N −k −1)!
(M −1)!(N −k)!
=
N X
k=1
(1−d)M+k−1d N−k (M +N −1)!
(M +k −1)!(N −k)!
.
PROOF. Weproceed byinduction. For anypositive M, the equalityiseasily showntobe
satisﬁed for N =1. We claim that for any N ≥2, if the equality is satisﬁed for N −1, then
it is satisﬁed for N. To see this, evaluate the above expression on the left-hand side at N
and at N −1. The difference is
N X
k=1
(1−d)M+N−k (M +N −k −1)!
(M −1)!(N −k)!
−
N−1 X
k=1
(1−d)M+N−1−k (M +N −k −2)!
(M −1)!(N −1−k)!
=(1−d)M+N−1 (M +N −2)!
(M −1)!(N −1)!
.
Similarly, evaluate the above expression on the right-hand side at N and at N −1. The
difference is
N X
k=1
(1−d)M+k−1d N−k (M +N −1)!
(M +k −1)!(N −k)!
−
N−1 X
k=1
(1−d)M+k−1d N−k−1 (M +N −2)!
(M +k −1)!(N −1−k)!
=(1−d)M+N−1(M +N −2)!×
N X
k=1
H(k),
10We are very grateful to Aaron Robertson for explaining to us the Wilf–Zeilberger method (Petkovšek
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where
H(k)=
(1−d)k−Nd N−k(M +N −1)
(M +k −1)!(N −k)!
−
(1−d)k−Nd N−k−1
(M +k −1)!(N −k −1)!
=
(1−d)k−Nd N−k(M +N −1)−(1−d)k−Nd N−k−1(N −k)
(M +k −1)!(N −k)!
=
(1−d)k−Nd N−k(M +k −1)−(1−d)k+1−Nd N−k−1(N −k)
(M +k −1)!(N −k)!
=
(1−d)k−Nd N−k
(M +k −2)!(N −k)!
−
(1−d)k+1−Nd N−k−1
(M +k −1)!(N −k −1)!
for k =1,...,N −1 and
H(N)=
1
(M +N −2)!
.
Now deﬁne
J(k)=
(1−d)k−Nd N−k
(M +k −2)!(N −k)!
.
Since H(k)= J(k)− J(k +1) for k =1,...,N −1 and H(N)= J(N), we get
N X
k=1
H(k)= J(1)=
1
(M −1)!(N −1)!
.
It follows that the difference between the above expression on the right-hand side eval-
uated at N and at N −1 is also equal to
(1−d)M+N−1 (M +N −2)!
(M −1)!(N −1)!
. 
LEMMA A.2. For all M ∈N, N ∈N, and d ∈(0,1),
N X
k=1
(M +N −2)!
(M +k −2)!(N −k)!
(1−d)M+k−2d N−k
−
N X
k=1
(M +N −1)!
(M +k −1)!(N −k)!
(1−d)M+k−1d N−k
=(1−d)M−1d N (M +N −2)!
(M −1)!(N −1)!
.
PROOF. Note that
N X
k=1
(M +N −2)!
(M +k −2)!(N −k)!
(1−d)M+k−2d N−k
−
N X
k=1
(M +N −1)!
(M +k −1)!(N −k)!
(1−d)M+k−1d N−k
=(1−d)M+N−1(M +N −2)!
N X
k=1
ˆ H(k),480 Herrera and Martinelli Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
where
ˆ H(k)=
(1−d)k−N−1d N−k
(M +k −2)!(N −k)!
−
(1−d)k−Nd N−k(M +N −1)
(M +k −1)!(N −k)!
=
(1−d)k−N−1d N−k(M +k −1)−(1−d)k−Nd N−k(M +N −1)
(M +k −1)!(N −k)!
=
(1−d)k−N−1d N−k+1(M +k −1)−(1−d)k−Nd N−k(N −k)
(M +k −1)!(N −k)!
=
(1−d)k−N−1d N−k+1
(M +k −2)!(N −k)!
−
(1−d)k−Nd N−k
(M +k −1)!(N −k −1)!
for k =1,...,N −1, and
ˆ H(N)=
(1−d)−1
(M +N −2)!
−
1
(M +N −2)!
=
(1−d)−1d
(M +N −2)!
.
Now deﬁne
ˆ J(k)=
(1−d)k−N−1d N−k+1
(M +k −2)!(N −k)!
for k =1,...,N, and note that
ˆ H(k)= ˆ J(k)− ˆ J(k +1)
for k =1,...,N −1, and
ˆ H(N)= ˆ J(N).
Thus,
N X
k=1
ˆ H(k)= ˆ J(1)=
(1−d)−Nd N
(M −1)!(N −1)!
.
The statement in the lemma follows. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Suppose ﬁrst thatO =0 (the easier case). We have
P(LA,LB)=1−
Z 1/2
0
h0
LA,LB(a)da
=1−
Z 1/2
0
(LA +LB −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!
aLA−1(1−a)LB−1da.
Integrating by parts we obtain
P(LA,LB)=1−
(LA +LB −1)!
LA!(LB −1)!

1
2
LA+LB−1
−
(LA +LB −1)!
LA!(LB −2)!
Z 1/2
0
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Proceeding iteratively we obtain forO =0,
P(LA,LB)=1−
LB X
k=1

1
2
LA+LB−1 (LA +LB −1)!
(LA +k −1)!(LB −k)!
.
Now suppose thatO ≥1. We have
P(LA,LB)=
Z 1/2
0
Z a
0
hLA,LB(a,b)db da +
Z 1
1/2
Z 1−a
0
hLA,LB(a,b)db da.
Using Lemma 1,
P(LA,LB)=
(LA +LB +O −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!(O −1)!
×
 Z 1/2
0
Z a
0
aLA−1bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1db da
+
Z 1
1/2
Z 1−a
0
aLA−1bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1db da
!
.
Consider the ﬁrst inner integral. Integrating by parts we obtain
Z a
0
bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1db =
−aLB−1(1−2a)O
O
+
LB −1
O
Z a
0
bLB−2(1−a −b)O db.
Proceeding iteratively we obtain
Z a
0
bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1db
=−
LB X
k=1
(LB −1)!(O −1)!
(LB −k)!(O +k −1)!
aLB−k(1−2a)O+k−1 +
(LB −1)!(O −1)!
(O +LB −1)!
(1−a)O+LB−1.
Consider the second inner integral. Integrating by parts we obtain
Z 1−a
0
bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1db =
LB −1
O
Z 1−a
0
bLB−2(1−a −b)O db.
Proceeding iteratively we obtain
Z 1−a
0
bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1db =
(LB −1)!(O −1)!
(O +LB −1)!
(1−a)O+LB−1.
Substituting both inner integrals into the previous expression for P(LA,LB), we get
P(LA,LB)=
Z 1
0
(LA +LB +O −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB +O −1)!
aLA−1(1−a)LB+O−1da
−
(LA +LB +O −1)!
(LA −1)!
LB X
k=1
Z 1/2
0
aLA+LB−k−1(1−2a)O+k−1
(LB −k)!(O +k −1)!
da.482 Herrera and Martinelli Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
The ﬁrst term in this expression for P(LA,LB) is equal to
Z 1
0
h0
LA,LB+O(a)da,
which is equal to 1 because h0
LA,LB+O is a probability density with support (0,1). With
respect to the second term, integrating by parts we get
Z 1/2
0
aLA+LB−k−1(1−2a)O+k−1da =2
O +k −1
LA +LB −k
Z 1/2
0
aLA+LB−k(1−2a)O+k−2da.
Proceeding iteratively we obtain
Z 1/2
0
aLA+LB−k−1(1−2a)O+k−1da =

1
2
LA+LB−k (O +k −1)!(LA +LB −k −1)!
(LA +LB +O −1)!
.
Thus, forO ≥1,
P(LA,LB)=1−
LB X
k=1

1
2
LA+LB−k (LA +LB −k −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB −k)!
.
To show that the expressions for P(LA,LB) for the casesO = 0 andO ≥ 1 are equiva-
lent, we need to verify the identity
LB X
k=1

1
2
LA+LB−k (LA +LB −k −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB −k)!
=
LB X
k=1

1
2
LA+LB−1 (LA +LB −1)!
(LA +k −1)!(LB −k)!
.
This identity follows from Lemma A.1 letting M = LA, N = LB, and d =
1
2. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. Using the deﬁnition of PA(LA,LB) and Lemma 2,
PA(LA,LB)=P(LA,LB)−P(LA −1,LB)
=
LB X
k=1

1
2
LA+LB−2 (LA +LB −2)!
(LA +k −2)!(LB −k)!
−
LB X
k=1

1
2
LA+LB−1 (LA +LB −1)!
(LA +k −1)!(LB −k)!
.
Thus, we need to verify
LB X
k=1

1
2
LA+LB−2 (LA +LB −2)!
(LA +k −2)!(LB −k)!
−
LB X
k=1

1
2
LA+LB−1 (LA +LB −1)!
(LA +k −1)!(LB −k)!
=
1
2LA+LB−1
(LA +LB −2)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!
.
This identity follows from Lemma A.2 letting M = LA, N = LB, and d =
1
2. Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Group formation and voter participation 483
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. With respect to near single-peakedness from Lemma 3, we obtain
PA(LA +1,LB)
PA(LA,LB)
=
LA +LB −1
2LA
.
Thus,
PA(LA +1,LB)
PA(LA,LB)
Ò1 ⇐⇒ LB Ò LA +1.
With respect to symmetry from the deﬁnition of decisiveness, we obtain
PA(LA,LB)=PB(LB,LA),
and from Lemma 3 we obtain
PA(LA,LB)=PA(LB,LA). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5. Since parties A and B attract the fractions α and β, respectively,
of the voters in the intervals corresponding to the leaders for party A and party B, party
B wins the election if αa is smaller than βb.
Suppose ﬁrst thatO =0. In this case, B wins the election if a <β/(α+β). Thus
P(LA,LB)=1−
(LA +LB −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!
Z 1−γ
0
aLA−1(1−a)LB−1da,
where γ = α/(α + β). Integrating by parts iteratively, as in the proof of Lemma 2, we
obtain
P(LA,LB)=1−
LB X
k=1
(LA +LB −1)!
(LA +k −1)!(LB −k)!
(1−γ)LA+k−1γLB−k.
Now suppose thatO ≥ 1. Note that party B loses the election if b < αa/β. Note also
that b ≤1−a, and 1−a ≤αa/β if and only if a ≥β/(α+β)=1−γ. Thus,
P(LA,LB)=
Z 1−γ
0
Z αa/β
0
hLA,LB(a,b)db da +
Z 1
1−γ
Z 1−a
0
hLA,LB(a,b)db da.
Using Lemma 1,
P(LA,LB)=
(LA +LB +O −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!(O −1)!
×
 Z 1−γ
0
Z αa/β
0
aLA−1bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1db da
+
Z 1
1−γ
Z 1−a
0
aLA−1bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1db da
!
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Consider the inner integrals. Integrating by parts iteratively, as in the proof of Lemma 2,
we obtain
Z αa/β
0
bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1db
=−
LB X
k=1
(LB −1)!(O −1)!
(LB −k)!(O +k −1)!
(αa/β)LB−k(1−a −αa/β)O+k−1
+
(LB −1)!(O −1)!
(O +LB −1)!
(1−a)O+LB−1.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 2,
Z 1−a
0
bLB−1(1−a −b)O−1db =
(LB −1)!(O −1)!
(O +LB −1)!
(1−a)O+LB−1.
Substituting both inner integrals into the previous expression for P(LA,LB), we get
P(LA,LB)=1−
(LA +LB +O −1)!
(LA −1)!
LB X
k=1
Z 1−γ
0
(αa/β)LA+LB−k−1(1−a −αa/β)O+k−1
(LB −k)!(O +k −1)!
da.
With respect to the second term, integrating by parts iteratively
Z 1/2
0
aLA+LB−k−1(1−2a)O+k−1da =(1−γ)LA+LB−k (O +k −1)!(LA +LB −k −1)!
(LA +LB +O −1)!
.
Thus, forO ≥1,
P(LA,LB)=1−
LB X
k=1
(LA +LB −k −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB −k)!
(1−γ)LA+LB−k.
To show that the expressions for P(LA,LB) for the casesO = 0 andO ≥ 1 are equiva-
lent, we need to verify the identity
LB X
k=1
(1−γ)LA+LB−k (LA +LB −k −1)!
(LA −1)!(LB −k)!
=
LB X
k=1
(1−γ)LA+k−1γLB−k (LA +LB −1)!
(LA +k −1)!(LB −k)!
.
This identity follows from Lemma A.1 letting M = LA, N = LB, and d =γ.
Finally, using the deﬁnition of PA(LA,LB) and one of the (equivalent) expressions for
P(LA,LB), we obtain
PA(LA,LB)=P(LA,LB)−P(LA −1,LB)
=
LB X
k=1
(LA +LB −2)!
(LA +k −2)!(LB −k)!
(1−γ)LA+k−2γLB−k
−
LB X
k=1
(LA +LB −1)!
(LA +k −1)!(LB −k)!
(1−γ)LA+k−1γLB−k.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Group formation and voter participation 485
Thus, to prove the statement of the Lemma with respect to PA(LA,LB) we need to verify
the identity
LB X
k=1
(LA +LB −2)!
(LA +k −2)!(LB −k)!
(1−γ)LA+k−2γLB−k
−
LB X
k=1
(LA +LB −1)!
(LA +k −1)!(LB −k)!
(1−γ)LA+k−1γLB−k
=(1−γ)LA−1γLB (LA +LB −2)!
(LA −1)!(LB −1)!
.
This identity follows from Lemma A.1 letting M = LA, N = LB, and d = γ. The proof of
the statement with respect to PB(LA,LB) proceeds along similar lines. 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3. Using the expression for L∗ in Theorem 1 we get
1
22L∗+1
(2L∗)!
L∗!L∗!
≤ c/G <
1
22L∗−1
(2L∗ −2)!
(L∗ −1)!(L∗ −1)!
.
Since
1
22L+1
(2L)!
L!L!
is positive and converges monotonically to zero as L approaches inﬁnity, we get that
L∗ →+∞ as c/G →0. Moreover, since
1
22L+1
(2L)!
L!L!
−
1
22L−1
(2L −2)!
(L −1)!(L −1)!
→0 as L →+∞,
we get
c/G
1
22L∗+1
(2L∗)!
L∗!L∗!
→1 as c/G →0.
Using the expressions for the expected voter turnout and the expected winning margin
in Theorem 1, we obtain
W/T =
1
22L∗
(2L∗)!
L∗!L∗!
.
Thus
c/G
W/(2T)
→1 as c/G →0,
as stated in the corollary.
Now, using the Stirling formula,
1/
p
4πL∗
1
22L∗+1
(2L∗)!
L∗!L∗!
→1.486 Herrera and Martinelli Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Thus,
1/
p
4πL∗
W/(2T)
→1
or equivalently
L∗
(T/W)2/π
→1 as c/G →0.
The approximation result for 1/O follows from this and the expression for T in Theo-
rem 1. 
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